Understanding the Crimea Crisis

As I write, the Ukrainian region of Crimea is being absorbed by Russia, more or less openly. This represents a blatant challenge to the post-1991 European order, make no mistake, and so far Vladimir Putin is winning. After a sudden increase in Russian military personnel on the sensitive peninsula, more than 6,000 troops, mostly Special Operations Forces (SOF), Moscow has pulled out all the stops in waging what I have termed Special War: provocations, espionage, black and white propaganda, and the use of deniable SOF, often under false flag. None of this is new to the Russians, indeed it’s second-nature to the Kremlin, and Crimea today can best be viewed as one huge operation by Moscow’s powerful military intelligence, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which controls not just defense espionage matters but SOF too, what the Russians term SPETSNAZ.

The outcome in Crimea is no longer in doubt. The referendum on its status, whose vote tally is preordained, is scheduled for March 16; that President Obama and many Western leaders have noted this is illegal is all the more reason Moscow will do it. Western powers are spending much time and effort trying to undo the fait accompli in Crimea, to no effect now save posturing. What needs to be done is deterring the Kremlin’s next move, which is sure to come.

It is widely assumed that Putin’s next aggression will arrive in Eastern Ukraine, where there are large pockets of ethnic Russians, and where Moscow’s intelligence services have been playing their customary provocative games, laying the groundwork for full-scale Special War. Regrettably, I suspect the chances of a more-or-less overt Russian military move into Eastern Ukraine, to “protect” ethnic kin from “fascists,” are rising as Putin smells Western dithering in the face of his Crimean coup. Such an act will mean a full-scale war for Ukraine, which will soon involve NATO indirectly at least. Putin has the ability to seize much of Eastern Ukraine without much chance of defeat, but he may win himself a protracted conflict for which Russia is unready.

That said, there is no room for confident pleasantries yet of the sort we are seeing in the Western media: that the Kremlin is really losing, that Russia is on the ropes, that Putin is sowing the seeds of his eventual defeat. There is no doubt that Putin is lashing out in part due to Russia’s many weaknesses: economic, social, demographic, and political. Putin’s nostalgia for the Soviet Union – really, a deep longing for again having unquestioned Great Power status – is well known, but it needs to be recognized that over Crimea and Ukraine, Putin is acting simply in the manner of traditional Russian leaders: touchy about borders, at turns nakedly aggressive, desiring to have weak neighbors it can manipulate, worried about defending his land and people against myriad aggressors (some of them quite imaginary). Russia’s neighbors all know this pattern of conduct well, and are planning accordingly. Poland announced major defense reforms emphasizing territorial defense (i.e. defense against resurgent Russia) last fall, and now Sweden is following suit: there will be others.

To the surprise of no one actually acquainted with post-Cold War Europe, the collective response of European powers to the Crimean crisis has been underwhelming, to be kind. There has been no united front against Kremlin aggression as there is no common vision of what needs defending among members of the European Union (EU). While Eastern members properly feel an urgency about Russian moves, members further West seem less inclined to inconvenience themselves and their comfortable lives. The response in Germany, the most powerful EU country economically and politically, has been particularly repulsive where, thanks to underfunding and a lack of seriousness about defense matters, the Bundeswehr is incapable of offering much in terms of deterrence anyway, and the Kremlin’s buying off of much of Germany’s political elite has done the rest. Given German misdeeds in Poland and other Eastern European countries between 1939 and 1945, that are now threatened by Moscow, Berlin’s lackadaiscal response reveals moral, not just political, failings.

As the EU has been revealed to be a dilettante’s talk-shop outside economics, better suited to debates about cheese regulations than serious matters of statecraft, the burden must fall on NATO which, thanks to gross underinvestment in defense by nearly all European members, means that falls on the United States. There is no doubt that, in extremis, the United States would honor its Article 5 obligations and go to war to defend any NATO country directly threatened by Russian invasion. But what of countries threatened more indirectly by Special War à la russe – by subversion, terrorism, and violence by “self-defense militias” that the Kremlin swears it has nothing to do with? And what happens in a few years when the American military, already tired by a dozen years of failed wars  in the Middle East and increasingly hollowed out by massive defense spending cuts, lacks sufficient power to deter Russia quickly and convincingly? These are the stuff of Eastern European NATO nightmares, and properly so.

Perhaps most unsettling is the manner in which Western observers fail to note what actually motivates Putin and his country. Let there be no mistake, Moscow’s nakedly nationalist chest-beating is widely popular among average Russians; its opponents represent a distinctly minority view that natives will cheerfully explain is foreign-controlled anyway. We hear much happy-talk about the “irrationality” of Kremlin conduct, that such aggression has no place in our current, advanced age, and that it all makes no economic sense anyway. Historians are aware that remarkably similar language was employed by Western pundits and statesmen in the late 1930s to explain away the increasingly aggressive behavior, including cheerful disregard for international norms, by another leader of a resurgent yet recently defeated power.

Russia was indeed a defeated power after 1991, and it nurses a deep sense of humiliation at the hands of the West and especially the United States. I have more than a little sympathy for this viewpoint, and there can no doubt that, in the 1990s, Washington, DC, paid far too little attention to Moscow’s views on much of anything, and we are now paying the price for that, repaid with onerous interest to the Kremlin. U.S. and NATO actions in the Balkans, at the expense of Russia’s troublesome old friend Serbia, have come back to haunt, and Moscow’s representatives now cannot contain their glee  pointing out that, if NATO could unilaterally redraw the internationally recognized borders of Serbia in 1999, why cannot Russia to the same to Ukraine now? If the brief Georgia war of 2008 was payback for Kosovo – and it certainly was – what is playing out now over Ukraine is merely the next stage of Moscow’s revenge, for much higher stakes.

Revenge is a category not much discussed in college International Relations classes, but it is a prime motivator for Putin and his country now. Humiliating the United States and NATO is a major strategic aim for the Kremlin, and from their viewpoint an entirely rational – not to mention entirely delicious – one. While the Kremlin will not risk a major war with the West, which they know would be a disaster of vast proportions, they are quite happy to come close enough to show NATO and America to be the decadent weaklings that Putin and millions of Russians are quite confident that we are. To state the obvious, the risk of serious miscalculation, another historic Russian speciality in foreign affairs, is grave now.

But do not expect the Kremlin to back off yet, Putin and his retinue are enjoying this too much to stop now. Moscow has wanted to redraw the internal borders of the USSR, which do not reflect ethnic realities well, ever since 1991, and in this revanchist game Ukraine is the biggest prize of all. Simply put, Barack Obama is the first American president Moscow has felt they could pull this off against. This is painful to say, not least because this author – like many foreign policy watchers – was optimistic at the start that President Obama could undo the massive harm done to America’s international reputation by George W. Bush. Yet Moscow has taken a different view of all this from the outset, seeing weakness where others saw lawyerly consideration and American-style optimism.

This has been plain to see for some time. While Western Europe was celebrating Obama as something vaguely divine – his pre-victory speech at Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize for having done nothing save not being President Bush, are fated to go down as two of the strangest happenings in modern foreign affairs – Russia was much less impressed. When Obama was first elected, Moscow pundits, including respected, level-headed ones, spoke as if America had lost its collective mind. Putin’s contempt for Obama has never been well disguised, and has only become more obvious with time, and many average Russians feel the same. Russian, like many Slavic languages, revels in countless put-downs implying weakness and effeminacy, and if you spend any time among Russians, even highly educated ones, you will hear the full range of them of them used to describe President Obama – lately, often with a laugh.

This was probably inevitable: how else did anyone expect the “former” KGB officer and judo master to look at the law professor and community organizer? Yet policies matter more, and over the last five years, Obama’s policies have gradually opened the door to a stronger, more assertive Russia in the world, above all the disaster over Syria which, as my colleague Tom Nichols and I noted several times last year, represented an opening beyond the Middle East that Putin was sure to take advantage of, and so he has.

All is far from lost. In his last year in office, President Jimmy Carter, shaken by Kremlin aggression, above all in Afghanistan, woke up to reality and took decisive action, raising defense spending and getting tough with the USSR in something like Special War, thereby setting the stage for victory in the Cold War a decade later, something which too few pundits have been willing to credit President Carter. Something similar can be done now, and ought to be. Deterrence, particularly in the realm of Special War, is the language that Putin speaks and understands well. This, plus bolstering NATO’s conventional defenses in the East, is entirely within our power and needs to be done urgently to forestall more Russian bad behavior.

Yet there are reasons to doubt this will happen soon enough, not least due to the basic dysfunction of this White House in foreign policy. This is not news, yet matters greatly now. Simply put, President Obama has surrounded himself with people who are not up to the challenge presented by the Kremlin over Ukraine and beyond. I’ve named some of them before, and don’t need to do so again. Most seriously, the consolidation of foreign policy decision-making in a few hands in this White House is without modern precedent and cancerous. It’s hardly a secret inside the Beltway that both the Departments of State and Defense, the former not exactly being a right-wing bastion, have been marginalized under Obama to a dangerous extent. In the recent scandal of Obama appointing campaign donors to ambassadorships when they seemed not to even know where the country in question was, I could not help but note that this really makes no difference, since all important foreign policy decisions are being made by a few, often young, staffers in the White House, outside the normal State Department chain.

A related factor here surely is that the United States has groomed a whole generation of foreign policy wonks-in-training who lack any real understanding of how the world actually works. These impressive-on-paper people – let it be noted they are legion in both parties – the under-45’s who are always graduates of the right schools and first-rate players of The Game in Washington, DC (which really comes down to cultivating the right mentors who will guide you to the proper think-tank until your party returns to power), are no match for the stone-cold killers of the Kremlin, led by the Chekist-in-Chief Putin. They have grown up in a world where unipolar American power has never been challenged, and while they can utter pleasant, Davos-ready platitudes about the whole range of bien pensant issues – global warming, emerging trends in micro-finance, gender matters on the Subcontinent, et al – they have quite literally nothing to say when old-school conventional threats emerge and enemies – yes, enemies: not rivals or merely misunderstood would-be partners – emerge from the darkness with conquest and killing on their minds.

In the present-day West, it’s commonplace to have a laugh at Vladimir Putin’s weirdly macho (and more than a little homoerotic) posturings, and I’ve done it too – how not, among the panoply of martial arts, bears, and countless shirtless adventures before the cameras? Yet in Russia they love this stuff, without a laugh-track. They are not yet as post-modern as we are, and they find reassurance in an old-school leader who talks about – and more importantly demonstrates – strength in a dangerous world. The first decade of the post-Soviet era was an economic, political, and social catastrophe for Russia, and Putin, whatever his faults, has been a pleasant change in the eyes of most Russians, which is why they back him through thick and thin. The Putin era will end someday, probably with Russia more isolated from the world than ever, but that coda may be some difficult decades off.

In the meantime, Western leaders must find the strength to resist Russian aggression through deterrence. Credibility must come first, as without it all our nuclear warheads, conventional forces, and economic leverage mean little and will not impress. NATO can deter Putin’s misdeeds, far beyond Ukraine, but that will require reinvestment in collective defense, not just cheap talk and expensive conferences. European NATO members have become accustomed to American leadership and gap-filling at all times, but they need to confront the reality that they must do more, and soon. Across the West, we need leaders who understand the stakes now and how to prevent war through strength and cunning. As is always the case in war, cold or hot, we need to become a little bit like our enemy to deter him. If our leaders cannot do that, get new leaders – and soon, as this game is real and the stakes are high.

[The author’s comments are his alone and certainly not representative of any of his employers, past or present.]


48 comments on “Understanding the Crimea Crisis”
  1. mrmeangenes says:

    Reblogged this on mrmeangenes and commented:
    Well said !!
    Bitter medicine, perhaps-but not useless candy !

  2. adam says:

    I totally agree with you here John. People are becoming too worried about idenity politics and other crap to truly care about great power games any more. Pppsh, the cold war was over 20 years ago man! Who cares!

  3. Uwe Weber says:

    One small correction: In 2008 (pre election) Obama held a speech at Siegessäule not at Brandenburg Gate. Merkel would not let him use the place at the Gate and this has more or less ruined their personal relationship. Last year he spoke at the Gate which was meant as symbolical restart between the two.

    And regarding the situation in Germany: You wouldn’t believe how much Kremlin agitprop is published here. Looks like they did not only buy the political elite.

    1. 20committee says:

      Danke….and I’m afraid I would believe you. 🙂

  4. E says:

    Does anyone have a basic (but realistic) NATO v Russia breakdown of conventional forces?

    Would be curious to see how many men (and women!) NATO partially or fully mobilized could put in the field against Russia.

  5. DWD says:

    This is really well done, but I wonder how far we can even move NATO when it seems that our European partners are deeply committed to doing nothing apart from scolding Russia. Would you start by propping up Kiev? The fact that the Ukrainian government is in tatters makes countering what Putin is doing that much more challenging.

    1. 20committee says:

      Great question, honestly. No choice but to prop up Kyiv now, with the understanding it may not do much.

      1. DWD says:

        Exactly; it’s probably not going to accomplish anything but it’s hard to envision any way forward if there’s no real Ukrainian government. The election in May, assuming it actually happens, isn’t going to magically create a stable government, especially not if it has to be conducted while part of the country is in the process of being occupied and/or annexed.

  6. Emastmagy says:

    It’s like what they say in Ethiopia. “I gave birth to a fire that i can neither nurse nor abandon”. Economy sanctions won’t work since most of the west greatly depend on Russia. Negotiation won’t work since it’s Putin. War? Well war never worked. Period

  7. Doremus Jessup says:

    I pretty much agree with this article save for the one glaringly obvious error, the axe grinding against latte sipping elites and one other tiny little thing which is where I’ll start.

    I have no doubt the Russians have no respect for Obama but it’s not because he’s a Harvard educated lawyer, so was Kennedy after all. And surely their lack of respect is not because he was a community organizer because Lech Walensa was a also community organizer. No, there must be another reason for their jokes and lack of respect. I’m sure you can figure it out if you think about it, John. Where would the Russians get such an idea that a community organizer is someone to be mocked?

    I have no insight into the “real world” experience of Obama’s foreign policy advisors or whether or not they lack the killer instinct so I won’t try to comment on that aspect which leaves the glaringly obvious error:

    Simply put, Barack Obama is the first American president Moscow has felt they could pull this off against.

    That sentence completely ignores Russia invading Georgia in 2008. It wasn’t Obama’s policies that gradually opened the door to a more assertive Russia, it was his predecessors. It was under Bush that the decision was made to shut down CIA operations in that part of the world and focus all their attention on the Middle East.

    It’s not my intention to blindly defend Obama, he’s made his share of mistakes.

    I agree with everything else.

    1. 20committee says:

      Sorry reality hurts you. PS it’s Wałęsa

      1. Doremus Jessup says:

        Other than my spelling mistake, tell me where I’m wrong?

      2. 20committee says:

        I already did.

      3. nimh2 says:

        Seriously? He makes some good, substantive points, citing details that counter this particular argument of yours. While at the same time respectfully pointing out that he agrees with you on all the rest of your post. And your response is nothing but a childish insult and a spelling correction?

      4. 20committee says:

        He does not like one of my arguments and does not intend to listen to why. No point. It’s like trying to explain to Bush fans circa 2006 that Iraq was a total mess – they refused to listen. If this hurts your tender feelings, that’s too bad.

    2. Me says:

      There are Polish – probably Russian too – documents regarding Lech Wałęsa as a Secret Associate of Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa) and their authenticity is said to be conclusive. For more, look up dr hab. Sławomir Cenckiewicz, the author of ‘The long arm of Moscow’ (‘Długie ramię Moskwy’) and Adviser to the Deputy Minister of National Defence during the process of the Military Information Services (WSI) – Russian mole organization – liquidation.

      It should be noted that it doesn’t mean Wałęsa haven’t tried to break out from the deal – probably during his presidency, what can be found in propaganda shifts during the 90s in Poland – but that might explain the ‘respect’ Wałęsa receives from the red side.

  8. Someone tear up the railroad tracks leading to Simferopol and put a division of troops across the isthmus before you go into Crimea. Let the Russians supply everything through Kerch. Ban vacation travel to Crimea, unless travellers can pay a $2000 luxury tax.
    This is really very simple. Let the rest of Ukraine help Crimea to be independent by shutting down all railroad shipments to the Crimea immediately. Stop all shipments by boat to Crimea from other Ukraine ports and prohibit any flights within Ukraine to fly to Sevastopol. Then prohibit any “foreign travel” to Crimea before the summer tourist season begins. The only thing they grow there is wine and prohibit buying wine from Crimean wineries.
    If the Russians want Crimea so bad,let them support the lives of everyone in Crimea and see how long their STUPID PUTIN PIG PARTY LASTS ! I love Ukraine and especially Crimea but to let a criminal like Putin to occupy it with impunity is like letting Hitler walk into Poland and France. Long live Ukraine.
    But is a peaceful step. Russia is isolating Ukraine soldiers in their own barracks so let Ukraine isolate the Russian soldiers from the mainland of Ukraine and say they are doing the same thing to the Russian soldiers that the Russian soldiers did to the Ukraine soldiers.

    1. Oleh says:

      No need to block rails or bar tourists. Crimea gets all of its gas, most of its power, and much of its fresh water from Ukraine. All of that can be cut-off in one hour. Also, tourists – even Russian tourists – will be in no hurry to “relax” on beaches patrolled by heavily armed “local volunteers” and authentic local volunteers who go about threatening and assaulting people.

      Kyiv can easily apply severe pressure if it comes to that; but pity the poor people of Crimea who will suffer most.

      Russia will send enough aid to Crimea to hurt the Russian economy, but nit enough to compensate Crimea for the damage done.

  9. History Never Ended says:

    Perhaps your use of the term “Secret War” is the newest generation of old Soviet “Active Measures”? Certainly seems so, if you look at the details.


    1. History Never Ended says:

      LOL…just saw your initial post on the topic, and I see you were thinking along the same lines!

  10. Reblogged this on Smart Talk Blog and commented:
    John R. Schindler’s biography is highly impressive. He is professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, where he teaches courses on security, strategy, intelligence, terrorism, and occasionally military history. His articles on the Crimean and Ukrainian crises are thoughtful, insightful, and represent some of the best writing on the subject anywhere.

  11. MarqueG says:

    Insightful take, John. As a Deutsch-Ami who lived in DE for much of the 1990s, my impression was that the biggest Russian political buyout of the German political establishment was of Gerhard “Gazprom Gerd” Schröder. That tied the country to Russia as major energy source. The rest wasn’t so much of a Russian buyout as a German buy-in to the post-modernist politico-academic American left.

    Hang out around German universities in the Arts and Humanities fields, and you’ll be blown away by a stiff breeze of dogmatic anti-Americanism. Think Howard Zinn as the political center. Lots of deeply anti-Western, “anti-imperialist,” “Anti-Fa” claptrap. Much of this political infusion occurred as the 1968 rebels did their “Marsch durch die Institutionen.” And the ’68 radicals were heavily subverted by the Soviets during the Cold War.

    Another subtle factor that has made German society a bit more stand-offish towards America was the unpopular push for the aggressive eastward expansion of Nato and the EU. Throughout the ’90s, German voters came to see the political agitation from Washington to move the geographic center of Nato as a bad thing, because it regularly came to mean expanding the EU and, with it, the Schengen Treaty territories. The sense was that Bonn/Berlin and Brussels were too eager to bite off more multiculturalism than German society could chew — particularly because of the contemporary experience of the non-integrating Turkish “Gastarbeiter.”

    … I could go on, but this is already too long, and the kitchen ain’t gonna install itself… 😉

    Thanks for being thought-provoking, though.

  12. hollyasbury says:

    A few questions, which leave me wondering exactly what Obama and his girls, who manage his administration, did in Ukraine prior to the major escalation. Victoria Nuland met with protestors in the streets of Kiev (G. Murphy Donovan, wrote of this at The American Thinker: http://americanthinker.com/2014/03/vulgar_amateurs_at_the_state_department_.html, 3/7/14). In early February CBS reported on a Russian claim that the US was funding arms and training for Ukraine rebels. Someone leaked the Nuland phone conversation where she was dictating which rebel leaders can be part of the new Ukraine government (oh, what a champion for democracy). First, this woman revised the Benghazi report – another US gun-running fiasco and has her fingerprints on this Ukraine debacle. Was the Obama administration arming Ukraine rebels? Poised right next to Russia, wouldn’t that be a stupid provocation? How much do we know about these various protestors in Ukraine? This smells so much like this administration’s arming rebels in Syria debacle, that I wonder what exactly Obama and his little Amazon princesses secretly did to provoke and destabilize Ukraine. Nuland’s sister-in-law, Kimberly Kagan, tried to persuade the US into military action in Syria, via her fraud, Elizabeth O’Bagy. Events don’t happen in a vacuum, so it would help to know exactly what the US actions were along the way, as the Russians played chess and Obama’s warrior princesses beat on their chests???

  13. Bob Alkema says:

    I met a Russian nurse (with a thick accent) while visiting my mother at a hospital in San Diego last week. Crimea was being discussed on the news channel in the room, and the nurse’s eyes were glued to the TV. I asked her what she thought about Crimea.

    Her response: “Crimea is a part of Russia, they use the Russian language after all. It was immoral that Nikita Khrushchev gave Crimea to The Ukraine. How can one person make a whole territory slaves to another?”

    I have no idea if this narrative was passed down from her family, or from the Russian media. Who knows what the truth is? But, I do enjoy reading the analysis and insight you provide.

    However, if San Diego was given to Mexico by our community organizer in chief, I believe we would feel the same way as the Russian nurse does about Crimea…

    1. 20committee says:

      Standard RU narrative there, really.

    2. Me says:

      Try a picture of a puppy with RF flag next time, might work better.

  14. Storm Jarl says:

    A great post from John and he puts it very well; «….more than 6,000 troops, mostly Special Operations Forces (SOF), Moscow has pulled out all the stops in waging what I have termed Special War: provocations, espionage, black and white propaganda, and the use of deniable SOF, often under false flag…..»

    But then looking back in time, not far, only back to 2007 and 2008: Estonia and Georgia – both were victims of a cyber lock down, or to keep it Army style: I would call it heavy artillery attack in cyber. This time in Ukraine is different, very different.
    I would say we have seen cyber sabotage for more than a week digital and physical sabotage against civilian comms, but there has been something else, things like this:


    «The Ukrainian authorities said last week the country’s telecommunications system had come under attack, with equipment installed in Russian-controlled Crimea used to interfere with the mobile phones of members of parliament.»
    Read that once more «interfere with the mobile phones of members of parliament», what is that? I call it targeting. Targeting decision makers. Who uses targeting? My totally wild guess is: INTEL units and SOF units in cyber ladies and gentlemen.

    Semper Paratus – Semper Fidelis – Pax!

    1. 20committee says:

      Well said, as always!

  15. Me says:

    Ethnic conflict is being engineered in Crimea: https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=mQRzTPEbTeg#t=42

    Marking Tatar homes with ‘X’ is nazi-like behaviour and it’s not a rhetorical figure.

  16. Mark says:

    Russia’s move in Ukraine is correct. The coup-imposed government serves American interests, and therefore needs to be deposed.

    And in a not-so-distant future, I see Germany going east, and so do many geopolitical analysts, which is great.

    America itself serves Zionist interests with the permanent/deep state neocon government, so it’s not surprising that many Americans are siding with Russia in this.

    Zionist Jews were at the forefront in promoting the 1965 Immigration Act, responsible for deconstructing America’s European roots (90% white back then, 60% now and falling). As the country starts to resemble Central and South America more and more, the power of America will decline and a shift in identity will take place. Europe’s approximity to Russia will ensure the former’s orientation towards the latter.

    America is open to demoralization in many fronts, and Russian agents and sympathizers will abuse this weakness.

  17. mrmeangenes says:

    Aw Jeez !! Dr.Schindler forgot about the Zionists !

    Look at ’em ! Sitting there grinning, nibbling matzohs, and swigging down that poisonously sweet wine !!

    Thanks for the reminder, Mark !!

  18. Chernoff says:

    By hook or by crook

    Good write an old man. True, clear and inspiredly for the Russian

    people. Right about Putin. Not so good about Obama. President Obama

    may be the most educated President of America of the contemporary


    What about you, professor. May be, you have been a bad student, or

    American University courses in International relations are bad.

    1. History knows clear term of the vengeance in the International


    An exclusive historical examples:

    11 November 1918 – The Armistice with Germany agreed near Compiegne

    the end of World War I.

    22 June 1940 – Second Compiegne. Armistice with France, in the name

    of the great deal of the Vengeance, Nazi Germany had provided between

    defeated France in the same vagon and place in Compiegne as in 1918.

    2. Why you think about virtual possibility of gaining of the new-USSR.

    May be, you ought to know that the USSR is not destroyed. As well as,

    you know – “what is not finished, is not done”.

    Brzesinsky disappointed yours hopes.

    Polish variant is not applicable to the USSR. The is another mentality.

    “Not only ‘to take’, rather ‘to give’…”

    More, until Ukraine and Belarus are in contact with Russia (may be you

    know about Russian ethnic group in Ukraine near 20 mln. people, and they

    do not want live in Russia, but in Ukraine, and their interests ought to

    be confirmed in the law) may be the USSR is alive.

    That’s why, G8 ought to give for Ukraine ‘in writing’ guarantee of neu-

    trality, as well as, to Austria and Finland.

    But after USSR destroyed de jure, G7 do not guaranted ‘in writing’ Neu-

    trality for Ukraine likes to Austria and Finland arter WW II.

    Why? May be for masked dealing with unfinishing deals in the style of

    Polish variant.

    More, after Ukrainian ask about next steps in the ensure of the national

    security, “NATO representative James Appaturay said about possibility

    of Commision’s work, but NATO can not to give assistance in sens of se-

    curity” (Wikipedia, 34).

    That’s why they (G7, NATO) leave Ukraine in the zone of “outlaw”. To

    provide agitation ‘for the better life’ with NATO, with EU.

    To provide, at least, anticonstitutional revolutions of ‘african type’

    with exchange of King. And, at last, to destroy USSR de facto, and to

    reach finish target – to privitize USSR’s national resources.

    May be you want advance?

    Do not trouble trouble until trouble troubles you…

    In the XXI centure in the International relations there is any new

    upgraded thought (from American experience)- ‘who thinks earlier…’

    And study history, professor.

    March, 2014, Kiev

  19. Michael says:

    Watching this develop I was reminded of the 1999 Russian “occupation” of the airport in Kosovo ahead of the NATO forces that were driving in while the Serbian forces were departing.

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